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11. Introduction
Each institutional change brings socio-economic reforms, which affect small or large shares 
of the population. The collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia tells 
us a story of this kind: each transition has its winners and its losers, and when the reformation is 
piloted from the centre (i.e. by the government), the proportion of winners may be crucial to 
determine which path (if any) the renovation will follow. Even where the reformer is in control 
of the situation and has strong power, turmoil is possible if a too large part of the population is 
unsatisfied: the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989 are the proof. The transition from a 
socialist centrally planned economy to a market oriented one is an example of revolution, which 
needs the support of the population. Indeed Williamson (1994) individuates three main 
ingredients for the successful creation of a market economy: visionary leadership, a coherent 
economic team and the support of the population. The third factor plays a major role to ensure 
the success of a reform also in theoretical models (Rodrik, 1996; Drazen, 2000 and Roland, 
2002) and empirical studies (Fidrmuc, 2000; Alesina et al., 2001 and 2004).
Formerly a French colony, independent since 1954, divided forcefully by the independence 
treaty, devastated by a long war, then reunited and on the way of fundamental political and 
economic reforms, Vietnam offers the possibility to inquiry a transition with reunification, 
which has followed a path partly opposite to the German’s. Northern Vietnam won the war 
against the South in 1975: at that time the economies of the two countries were very dissimilar, 
with a communist North and a South characterised by an authoritarian regime enforcing a 
market oriented system. Since the end of the war and for about three years South Vietnam was 
ruled by a puppet government charged to reform the economic system by implementing the first 
socialist reforms. Then, in 1978, when the “socialization” of the southern economy was at its 
beginning, the two countries merged. The government of Hanoi continued its policy of 
collectivisation of the South, but this was slow, and the results were poor. During the last years 
of life of the major European communist regimes, once the aids from the Soviet Union were 
already scarce and discontinuous, following the example of People’s China, the Vietnamese 
government started a process of deep reforms (the so-called doi moi), aimed at modernising the 
economic system through the abolition of collectivism and the introduction of a market 
economy. The beginning of this process is commonly fixed in 1986 (Fahey, 1997), and since 
then several important reforms have been implemented
1: agriculture, industry and the main 
services (health, financials, trade) have been progressively reformed and reshaped to be conform 
to a modern market economy. However in some cases (see Gabriele, 2006 for the health sector) 
these reforms have contributed to a deterioration of the quality offered to customers. The doi 
moi started basically as a response to the dramatic economic situation of the country in the 
1980s, but was not limited to a stabilisation plan. It has involved all the levels of the economy 
and has produced deep social changes. 
Among the extant articles and books on transition economies, only very few examine the 
popular support to the ongoing reforms, or to the establishment of a market economy, ultimate 
target of the process. Redding and Witt (2009) and Migheli (2010) examine China and conclude 
that the Chinese generally support the transition; in particular, Migheli (2010) finds that the 
Chinese tend to be even more supportive than the Indians, who have never abandoned a market 
system in spite of the introduction of some socialist-inspired policies. However in Vietnam the 
situation is complicated by the relatively recent reunification of the country and the two 
different regimes, to which the two formers countries were subject. In addition, as I will discuss 
later, the economy of the southern regions has never been transformed into a socialist system. 
On the one hand this accentuates the differences between North and South, on the other hand 
1 For details see the next section. 
2southern Vietnamese have never experienced a fully socialist economy. This means that while 
“market” can be synonymous of “freedom from poverty” for many citizens of a formerly 
communist country, the same word may have lesser appeal for people who actually know that 
“market” and “end of poverty” are nor synonymous. Furthermore many southern Vietnamese 
did not like Thieu’s authoritarian regime, and probably today they would like to avoid a clone of 
it; for them “market” could thus entail also negative memories.  Actually, Corneo (2001), 
Corneo and Grüner (2002) and Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) study people’s preferences 
for redistributive policies in Germany, and find that Eastern Germans have stronger preferences 
for income redistribution than Western Germans. According to the authors forty-five years of 
communism are responsible of this difference in preferences. Dalton and Ong (2006) propose a 
preliminary
2 inquiry which addresses the issue of people’s support for a market economy in 
Vietnam and other countries. From this study Vietnam obtains scores which are very similar to 
those of China; taken together with those of Migheli (2010), these results suggest to expect a 
strong support for a market economy. 
 
Vietnam is a very interesting case-study for at least three reasons. Firstly, the transition of 
the South is double: from a market-oriented economy to a collectivist system, and from the 
latter to the former again. Secondly, the transition from a socialist to a market-oriented economy 
is ruled by a communist party (whereas in general this is not the case, with the notable exception 
of China). Thirdly, Vietnam is today a major emerging economy. This paper aims at studying 
whether the Vietnamese’s preferences for a market economy show support for doi moi and 
whether there are differences between northern and southern
3 citizens. 
The main findings of this paper show that, while the people’s support to doi moi is not at 
risk, the government has to monitor the speed and the impact of the reforms carefully, in order 
not to create popular discontent. 
2 The quoted paper presents descriptive statistics only. 
3 Here and in the following of the paper, “northern” refers always (if not differently indicated) to former North Vietnam, 
and “southern” to former South Vietnam.
32. Doi moi: a brief history
Since 1954 in the North and 1975 in the South the central planning systems had run 
agriculture through co-operatives, while state-owned enterprises dominated the industrial sector, 
focusing especially on heavy productions and large-scale projects (Fahey, 1997), as it was 
common in all the communist countries, where the planner pursued economic development 
through the expansion of the heavy industry. Actually between 1975 and 1978 a puppet 
government in Ho Chi Minh City was given the job of reforming the southern economy in a 
socialist way. However neither the puppet government nor the central planner after 1978 had 
ever reached significant results. While in 1971 96% of all the people employed in agriculture in 
the North belonged to a cooperative farm, in 1986 (year in which the system based on 
cooperatives ended) only less than 6% of the farmers in former South Vietnam were organized 
into collectives (Pingali and Xuan, 1992). The only appreciable effect of the effort to 
collectivise the southern agriculture was an effective redistribution of the land from the large 
tenants (heritage of the French domination) to the poor families. It is true that rice output grew, 
but it was the consequence of an expansion of the cultivated land rather than of the efforts for 
collectivising (Pingali and Xuan, 1992).  
At the beginning of the 1980s the economy of Vietnam was struggling. On the one hand 
collectivisation was ineffective and inefficient to promote and develop the agricultural and 
industrial productions; on the other hand the country had not yet recovered from the long war 
ended in 1975 and the difficult situation of the other communist countries (from where Vietnam 
had been receiving substantial helps) was leaving the country without sufficient aid. This 
translated into an insufficient production of rice (the main Vietnamese crop and the main 
component of the Vietnamese diet), famine and very high inflation. In its Sixth National 
Congress (1986) the communist party of Vietnam introduced significant reforms initially aimed 
at increasing the agricultural production and at stabilising the prices. In the following years the 
government passed several other market-oriented reforms, and the Constitution of 1992 
acknowledges   the   orientation   of   the   new   economic   policy   (Turley   and   Selden,   1993). 
Following the first act of reform of the agricultural system passed in 1987, the co-operatives 
were dismantled and the property of the land transferred to the farmers, according to a 
distributive system based on the number of household components (Do and Iyer, 2008). This 
reform was very successful, and already since 1989 Vietnam re-emerged as the second largest 
rice exporter in the world (Pingali and Xuan, 1992 and Glewwe et al., 2002).  In addition the 
government abandoned the old industrial policy and started a strategy to create surplus through 
the development of the light industry and, since 1989, encouraging the private sector (Sepehri 
and Akram-Lodhi, 2005; Hansen et al., 2009 and Nguyen et al., 2009). This sudden change in 
policies also promoted the development of a hidden economy, in particular land speculations 
and illegal trade of gold and precious stones, which attracted the poor aimed at gaining enough 
money to start a legal private activity (Fahey, 1997). 
However thanks to doi moi the poverty rate in Vietnam has dramatically decreased since the 
beginning of the reforms (Glewwe et al. 2002); this reduction has involved people living in the 
countryside and in the urban centres differently, with the latter benefiting more than the former 
(see also White and Masset, 2003). The reason behind this lies in the higher yields of industrial 
and tertiary jobs with respect to farming, despite the improvements in productivity of the 
agricultural sector (Glewwe et al., 2002).
A second fundamental change introduced by doi moi besides the private property of land 
and firms was to widen the range of salaries and to commensurate them to the productivity 
rather than to the seniority of the worker (Hiebert, 1993, Moock et al., 2003 and Liu, 2006). 
4However the returns to schooling are (still) higher in the public than in the private sector 
(Moock et al., 2003). 
Eventually the doi moi promoted a terrific increment of foreign trade (see Trinh Ha, 2005 
and Athukorala, 2009). Since its reunification, and as a consequence of the war and of the 
victory of the communist North, a trade embargo affected Vietnam. In addition the policy of the 
Vietnamese government restricted international trade furthermore. Only since the end of the 
1980s, as a part of the general plan of economic renovation, the government started a series of 
reforms, which have recently ended with the entrance of Vietnam in the WTO. The speed of this 
transformation is impressive, and the range of implemented actions very wide: from the removal 
of most export taxes and non-tariff barriers, to the signature of bilateral agreement with the 
major economies of the world (the EU in 1992 and the US in 2000)
4. Jenkins (2004) notes that 
the opening to international trade has boosted employment, as Vietnam offers cheap manpower, 
while technical abilities have increased over the time (as the changes in the structure of 
Vietnam’s trade show).
As a conclusion of this brief review of the major results of the doi moi, we can observe that 
there are reasons for the citizens to support a market economy, and reasons to oppose to the 
“renovation”. In particular decreasing poverty, increasing employment and better standards of 
life can induce the population to support the reforms; on the opposite side the deterioration of 
the quality of some services and the uncertainty about the duration of a job are likely to be good 
reasons to oppose to the process. Moreover it must be highlighted that the benefits have not 
been evenly spread: Nguyen et al. (2007) show that the urban-rural inequality has increased 
over the time, although it has decreased between northern and southern regions. In addition the 
authors  find that “Households  with greater  human capital  (e.g. education)  endowments 
benefited more from the reforms because the returns to their endowments changed.”
5  This may 
generate different levels of support across different categories of beneficiaries.
4 However Jenkins (2004) claims that, at the time he wrote his article, several restrictions were still operating, and the 
success of Vietnamese trade has to be found in the low cost of labour, rather than in the undertaken liberalisation. 
5  Nguyen et al. (2007), p. 480. This finding is consistent with Vecernik (1995), Orazem and Vodopivec (1995), 
Rutkowski (1996) and Brainerd (1998) for Eastern Europe. 
53. Data and methodology
The data come from the last two waves of the World Value Survey (WVS thereafter); these 
were conducted in Vietnam in 2001 and in 2006. For each wave around 1,250 observations are 
available for a total of 2,495, which are representative of all the Vietnamese provinces. The 
variables of interest for this paper are the answers to as many questions
6; in particular they are: 
the respondent’s opinion about competition as a good or bad feature of the economy, the 
respondent’s opinion about income inequality as an incentive for individual’s productivity and 
commitment at work and the respondent’s opinion about the state’s ownership of firms (whether 
this should increase or, rather, decrease). 
The first question considered here is the following: “Now I'd like you to tell me your views 
on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree 
completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on 
the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between
7. 
Sentences: Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas vs. 
Competition is harmful. It brings the worst in people”. In this case 1 means to consider 
competition as good and stimulating people to work and to develop new ideas, whilst 10 means 
to find competition to be harmful. In the analysis presented here the scale was reversed, in order 
to render the interpretation of the results clearer and easier. 
The second question attains the problem of income distribution. In particular the interviewee 
is asked about the current income distribution and whether he/she thinks it needs to be made 
more (or less) equal: “Incomes should be made more equal vs. We need larger income 
differences as incentives” where 1 means total agreement with the former sentence, and 10 
means total agreement with the latter. This variable gives double information. As in a free and 
competitive market people respond to incentives (see Easterly, 2001) higher grades should 
witness support for a free and competitive market.
Eventually the third question analyzed attains the role of the government in the economy. 
Specifically, it asks the respondents to grade the following couple of sentences: “Private 
ownership of business should be increased vs. Government ownership of business should be 
increased”. Answering 10 definitely means to support the intervention of the government in the 
economy; the responder’s preference against the rules of a market economy (i.e. in favour of 
state ownership is stronger as the grade increases.
The controls used in the analysis include gender and age of the responder as well as the 
income of his/her household expressed as the decile of the national distribution in which this 
income falls. The number of children and the type of job of the respondent are also used as 
controls. Last, but not least, the part of the country (either North or South or the administrative 
region), and the size of the town where the responder lives are introduced as independent 
variables. Hereafter I briefly comment upon the rationale for considering these variables as 
independent controls. The data used in this paper do not contain retired responders;  while 
people who are not in the usual range of working age [15 – 65] but who declared to work were 
also included. 
There are at least two reasons to consider gender: first the equality between genders is a 
fundamental pillar of the communist doctrine, and second women tend to be more risk averse 
6 For practical reasons due to the applied methodology (namely ordered probit regressions), all the variables coded in 
the range [1 – 10] were rescaled to [0 – 9].
7 This part of the question is equal also for the following quotes. As a consequence I will not report it, but I will quote 
the sentences to be graded only. 
6than men (Camerer, 2003). In both North and South Vietnam (but more in the former which 
experienced a longer ocialist regime, than in the latter) the distance between the behaviour of 
the two genders might be narrower than usually found as a consequence of indoctrination. This 
hypothesis relies on the assumption that the gender effect usually observed in the literature is 
due mainly (or at least partially) to nurture rather than to nature
8. As transition from a socialist 
to a market economy brings more uncertainty to people and increases some risks related to the 
job market (Easterlin and Plagnol, 2008), it is likely that women tend to be less in favour of a 
market economy than males are, as Gabriel (1992), Firebaugh and Sandu (1998), Hayo (1999a 
and 1999b) and Kaltenthaler et al. (2006) find. Age is another important factor. While old (and 
middle-age) people in South Vietnam have known both regimes (authoritarian capitalistic and 
socialist), the most of the population in the North has been familiar with the second system only
9. but living a long part of the life under a given regime can stimulate some nostalgia when that 
regime collapses of changes dramatically (Easterlin and Plagnol, 2008). As a consequence (a 
part of) the population may try to contrast the reforms, even if these could be beneficial for them
10. Last but not least the older a person is the lesser he/she is prone to accept any change to 
his/her life. Having children is likely to affect the responder’s outlook for the future, and hence 
his/her evaluation of the transition, as it is reasonable to assume that parents include their 
children’s utility in their own. 
The type of job is an important control for at least two reasons: first of all, as explained 
before, the benefits of a transition from a socialist to a market economy do not spread 
uniformly, but affect positively the employees of the private sector. In particular agricultural 
workers have received less benefits than the workers in the industrial and tertiary sectors, as the 
increase in the village-urban income gap testifies. In addition in Vietnam there is a particular 
category, those employed in the armed forces, which has always enjoyed large benefits under 
the socialist regime
11. Moreover the new wage policy, which links the remuneration to the 
productivity and the hierarchical position, is likely to benefit professionals, skilled workers and 
managers more than the other categories. As a consequence the support to the creation of a 
market economy can differ across the types of job. For the same reason (the village-urban gap) 
also the dimension of the town where the respondent lives is introduced as a control. In 
particular the WVS categorises the towns in eight clusters (numbered from 1 to 8), according to 
their population. 
All the responses to the previous questions take the form of categorical variables, and 
therefore are analyzed through ordered probit regressions, which allow to calculate the impact 
of a unit change in the value of each control on each unit (discrete) change in the value of the 
dependent variable. 
8 Very recently Croson and Gneezy (2009) have claimed that it is nurture more than nature to determine the gender 
effect observed in many economic papers.
9 Life expectancy in Vietnam is around 70 years.  
10 Indeed since people do not know ex ante if the reforms will bring benefits for them nor who will gain from them, 
people could be against a reform, that would be accepted ex post (see Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991).
11 This also as a consequence of the fact that it was the army to establish the socialist regime in the country. 
74. Results
The Vietnamese’s opinion about competition as a good “ingredient” of the economy is 
generally positive: on a 0-9 scale (where 9 stands for the best opinion) the average score in 2001 
was 6.20, slightly increased to 6.22 in 2006 (but the difference is not statistically significant). 
However North and South differ: in 2001 the mean score in the North was 6.59, and 5.91 in the 
South (difference significant at 99% level) and, while in both macro-regions the values have 
grown, in 2006 the scores were 6.35 and 6.09 respectively (difference significant at 95% level). 
Hence the convergence between the northern and the southern opinion is determined by two 
opposite trends: while northern Vietnamese people have become slightly more sceptical about 
competition during the time, the opposite has happened in the South. However the still high 
average scores witness the good opinion of the competition among the Vietnamese. 
Table 1 presents the results of an ordered probit
12, whose dependent variable is the opinion 
about competition. The econometric analysis confirms the difference between North and South: 
in the former competition is perceived better than in the latter. This opinion improves with the 
respondent’s household income and with being male rather than female. These two results are 
not surprising, as the economic literature generally finds that women are more averse to 
competition than men
13 (see for instance Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007); in addition people 
from households with high income are likely to be among those who are benefiting (have 
benefited) the most from the transition
14. Considering different jobs, those people who are 
related to a better opinion of competition are office workers, farmers and, above all, the 
agricultural workers. Again these categories reflect those which have gained the most at the 
beginning of the transition: the first sector to be reformed and privatized was agriculture, and 
both production and earnings increased considerably. Moreover, with the new (steeper) wage 
scale, the most of the benefits accrued to the most qualified positions, which are identified by 
office workers. The negative (though only weakly significant) sign of self-employed may be 
attributable to the heterogeneity of this group, which includes small businessmen, artisans, 
craftsmen, etc who may have been benefiting from transition at different levels. Eventually also 
the time trend is not significant (consistently with the mean values presented before). 
Tables 2 and 3 run the same analysis, focusing either on northern or on southern regions; a 
dummy for each of these regions is also present in the regressions to capture the possible 
heterogeneity within the macro-areas. Table 2 shows the results for the territories of former 
South Vietnam. While the figures for income are in line with Table 1, gender plays a stronger 
role in the South than in the North. For this at least two explanations are possible, both due to 
the different duration of the socialist experience in the two parts of the country. First: as the 
socialist doctrines aim at establishing equality of treatment and opportunity among genders, 
then women’s and men’s preferences in the North may be more homogeneous than in the South. 
Second: it is likely that people from the North see the transition as a big opportunity more than 
people from the South, since a large share of the northern population has never known a market 
economy system. In such case the expected gains from new opportunities can (partially) 
compensate the usual female hostility against competition. 
Only in the South the agricultural workers have a better opinion of competition than other 
job categories; however some marginal effects for the managerial group are significant, 
12 I would remind the reader that, in order to obtain the absolute impact of a given control on the dependent variable, 
each marginal coefficient has to be multiplied for the probability that a subject randomly drawn from the sample falls in 
each category (this value is that in the bottom line of each table). 
13 And the introduction of competition is one of the first and main changes in a process of transition. 
14 Remember that originally wages were almost equal for any category of workers and employees, and almost no rents 
or capital gains existed. 
8suggesting that. at given points on the preference scale, managers’ preferences are stronger than 
those of the other groups; in particular the significant marginal effects show that managers tend 
to have a good rather than a bad opinion about competition. Southern regions appear 
inhomogeneous: the reference (Mekong River Delta, where Ho Chi Minh City is located) shows 
on average a better opinion of competition of both South-East and South Central Coast. In the 
North (Table 3) unemployed people and, to a much lesser extent, the unskilled manual workers 
have a better opinion of competition than the others. Again this result is interpretable as 
disadvantaged people in the North seeing the transition (and competition in this case) as an 
opportunity for them to improve their conditions. Eventually also northern regions show no 
homogeneity: the population of North East and of North West has a better opinion of 
competition than Red River Delta’s (where Hanoi is located).
Tables 2 and 3 also highlight the contrasting time path followed by people’s preferences: 
whereas the coefficient for southern provinces is positive, that of the northern provinces is 
negative, supporting the previous finding.  
The second variable analyzed is the opinion about wage inequality as an incentive to 
workers. In 2001 the average score was 5.54 in northern provinces and 5.19 in southern 
(difference significant at 90% level); five years later the figures were 5.42 and 4.53 respectively 
(significance of the difference: 99%). In both the macro-regions the support to income 
inequality has thus decreased, and in the South has attained the average point of the scale (4.5). 
This figures can be better interpreted considering the theorem of the median voter as a simple 
benchmark: should the preference go under the median point (4.00), the government could start 
experiencing some (underground) opposition to its policies. In addition, over time, only the 
change in value in the South is significant (at 99% level). 
Table 4 presents the results for the whole country and shows a highly significant geographic 
effect: northern Vietnamese consider wage inequality as constituting an incentive to workers. 
Here we have to recall the original policy of the socialist government: when the Socialist 
Republic was established in the North (and then in the South) wages were set at very similar 
levels among different jobs. As a consequence it is likely that Northern Vietnamese support 
wage inequality more than southern citizens as a means to remunerate different skills and 
abilities. The coefficients of the other control variables show that the preference for inequality 
gets stronger and stronger as income increases (likely because the gains are larger) and as age 
“decreases”: young people, those who expect more benefits from transition, are more supportive 
of income inequality than old are. Indeed old people have less to gain, as their working life is 
shorter, and their education and skills can be only slightly improved to compete against the new 
generations. Men have a stronger preference than women for income inequality. Overall self-
employed workers prefer equality rather inequality, while part-time employees think that 
income inequality works as an incentive. People working in the agricultural sector and unskilled 
workers are not supportive of income inequality; as they are the least skilled categories, the 
actual transition and the reform of the wage policy would hardly benefit them; rather their 
relative position in the income scale is likely to worsen over time. Consequently they do not 
consider income inequality as an incentive. Consistently with this interpretation, the result is 
driven by northern people (Tables 5 and 6), who have experienced flat wages for a longer time. 
However, considering Tables 1 – 3, the agricultural workers are favourable to competition 
(while there is no difference between unskilled manual workers and the other categories). This 
suggests two possible interpretations: 1) they support competition (seen as some renewal) as 
long as it does not bring too much income disparity, or 2) as they are low-skilled an increase in 
income inequality worries them, but as agricultural workers they may hope to be assigned some 
land in future as a consequence of land reforms (and thus they are supportive of doi moi in 
9general and of competition in particular). Eventually the time trend captured by the regression 
presented in Table 4 reflects the situation of South provinces (Tables 5 and 6). 
Tables 5 and 6 highlight some differences between North and South. First: only northern 
men are more supportive of income inequality than women; in the South, although it is positive, 
the coefficient is not significant, and again the interpretation given for the results presented in 
Table 4 may hold. Second: in the South (and only there) the larger the town, the stronger the 
preference for inequality as an incentive (Table 5); larger towns demand more skilled workers, 
hence  people living there  have more opportunities  to get high wages  than in smaller 
agglomerates. Third: in the South, but not in the North, part time workers are in favour of 
income inequality, whereas self-employed are contrary. 
The last variable analysed refers to people’s preference for increasing the State ownership of 
firms. Here a high value represents discontent for the transition to a market economy. The 
average score of this variable in 2001 was 4.23 in the North and 4.51 in the South (difference 
significant at 90% level); in 2006 the respective figures were 4.12 and 3.88 (difference 
significant at 95% level). Again there is a difference between North and South, which reverses 
over time: in 2001 southern Vietnamese are weak supporters of state property of firms, whilst in 
2006 they are in favour to private property (it is interesting to notice that the average value here 
is lower than the median point of the scale). Overall in both the North and the South people tend 
to prefer private to state ownership
15; the time trend is not significant in the North, while it is in 
the south (at 99% level). 
Table 7 shows the results of the ordered probit analysis for the whole country. The lack of 
significance for the “south” dummy must be imputed to the temporal reversal of preferences in 
the South. Here unemployed, managers and professionals are all in favour of an increase of 
private property, while self-employed would prefer an increase in state ownership. This is not 
surprising, at least for two reasons: state-owned firms are less competitive, and in general they 
are stable and constant customers; taken together these two reasons are good incentives for 
current self-employed workers to oppose to an increase of private property of firms. The 
agricultural workers are in favour of increasing the private property of firms. Tables 8 and 9 
analyse southern and northern regions respectively. As before, some differences stand out; 
firstly the opposition to state ownership is led by southern managers and northern professionals 
and agricultural workers (the controls for these categories are not significant in the other part of 
the country); again this may be due to the longer experience and the deeper implementation of 
socialism in the northern regions (especially in the case of agriculture) than in southern ones, 
and again managers and professionals are the categories, which would benefit the most from the 
higher salaries paid by private firms. Secondly northern farmers are in favour of increasing the 
private property of firms, likely because they gained from the land privatisation. Tables 8 and 9 
also show a substantial homogeneity within North and South: only one region out of five in 
each macro-area differs significantly from the others; in particular people in South Central 
Coast would prefer state ownership to increase, whereas people from North East display the 
opposite wisdom. 
So far I have not mentioned the number of children. Tables 1 and 7 show that as their 
number increases, the opinion about competition worsens and the respondents prefer larger state 
ownership. In basic overlapping generations models parents tend to incorporate children’s utility 
in their own; hence the more children the responder has, the more sceptical about competition 
15 This is true if we consider the average figure; the situation changes if the median point is considered. While this 
distinction is not necessary for the other variables, as the average point is always far from the median point; here North 
and South are positioned on the two opposite sides of the river (represented by the median point). Hence, if the median 
voter theorem is assumed, North and South have different preferences about the relevance of the government as firm 
owner.
10and private property of firms he/she is, as a transition from a socialist to a market economy 
increases uncertainty generally and, above all, of job stability and income (Easterlin and 
Plagnol, 2008). However this result is a feature of southern provinces only; again this might 
suggest that northern Vietnamese value competition (seen as an opportunity to improve their 
lives) more than southern Vietnamese (who have almost never known a real socialist economy), 
and probably this is a consequence of the longer socialist experience.
115. Conclusions
The evidence presented in this paper highlights three main results: 1) the Vietnamese 
population is on average favourable to the current transition, especially to competition, to 
private property of firms and to considering wage inequality as an incentive to workers; 2) this 
popular support has tended to decrease over the period 2001 – 2006; 3) there are significant (and 
sometimes substantial) differences between northern and southern regions. Although the current 
process of transition does not seem to be threatened, not all the categories of workers support it; 
however, the agricultural workers tend to consider competition as a good ingredient of an 
economic system and they support the private property of firms. This is very important for 
Vietnam, as the primary sector is, still today, the major employer and the most relevant 
economic sector. In addition both the enforcement of socialism and the war against South 
Vietnam have been based on their material and political support. 
However the popular support shows some weaknesses that can not be neglected. Firstly, the 
agricultural workers do not consider income inequality as an incentive for workers; this casts 
some doubts on the solidity of the support brought by this category to the current policies. 
Indeed, as mentioned at the beginning of the paper, the change in the wage policy is a central 
pillar both of the transformation of the socialist economy into a market-oriented  system and of 
the government’s programme. Secondly the lack of homogeneity between northerners’ and 
southerners’ preferences reveals the presence of cultural and ideological differences between the 
two parts of the country. Thirdly the time path of the analysed variables suggests that the 
popular support to the reforms is weakening (or, at least, has been weakening between 2001 and 
2006).
Overall the results of this inquiry depict a situation with lights and shades. On the one hand 
the government can rely on a consistent people’s support for the transition process, as this let 
them foresee the opportunity of improving their socio-economic situation. On the other hand the 
Vietnamese are not ready to forego the stability and security of jobs and wages too fast, 
probably at least until the benefits from the transition will be more relevant, sure and 
widespread than they are now. Thus the Vietnamese government has to pursue the process of 
renovation and of establishment of a marker oriented economy, but it must avoid the mistake of 
running too fast. History is full of examples of enlightened governors whose policies were 
aimed at improving the lives of their citizens, but whose implementation was too fast and led to 
a counter-revolution. In order to ensure future people’s support to the  doi moi  process the 
government should pay more attention to the problem of income inequality and should adopt 
reforms which balance the need for renovation and growth and the people’s claim for a lesser 
(or slower) increase of the income inequality.
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15Table 1. Ordered Probit regression for considering the competition as a good feature for an economy
Coefficient
y=1 y=2 y=3 y=4 y=5 y=6 y=7 y=8 y=9
Male 0.198 -0.44 -0.67 -0.88 -2.03 -2.37 -0.01 0.39 0.75 6.69
(0.046)*** (0.13)*** (0.18)*** (0.23)*** (0.48)*** (0.56)*** (0.05) (0.10)*** (0.18)*** (1.54)***
Income 0.069 -0.16 -0.23 -0.31 -0.71 -0.83 n.s. 0.13 0.26 2.34
(0.015)*** (0.04)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.16)*** (0.19)*** n.s. (0.03)*** (0.06)*** (0.52)***
South -0.138 0.31 0.47 0.61 1.41 1.67 0.01 -0.26 -0.51 -4.67
(0.052)*** (0.13)** (0.19)** (0.24)*** (0.54)*** (0.65)*** (0.03) (0.10)*** (0.20)*** (1.68)***
Age 0.002 n.s. -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.07
(0.002) n.s. (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) n.s. n.s. n.s. (0.07)
Part time worker 0.031 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 -0.32 -0.39 n.s. 0.06 0.11 1.07
(0.083) (0.18) (0.27) (0.36) (0.85) (1.04) n.s. (0.14) (0.30) (2.85)
Self-employed worker -0.114 0.27 0.40 0.52 1.18 1.30 -0.04 -0.26 -0.46 -3.79
(0.061)* (0.15)* (0.23)* (0.30)* (0.64)* (0.66)** (0.05) (0.15)* (0.026)* (2.00)*
Number of children -0.038 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.39 0.45 n.s. -0.07 -0.14 -0.127
(0.016)** (0.04)** (0.06)** (0.07)** (0.16)** (0.19)** n.s. (0.03)** (0.006)*** (0.54)**
Unemployed 0.149 -0.31 -0.47 -0.63 -1.50 -1.95 -0.10 0.22 0.49 5.20
(0.109) (0.22) (0.33) (0.44) (1.09) (1.54) (0.15) (0.12)** (0.32) (3.93)
Manager 0.114 -0.24 -0.37 -0.49 -1.15 -1.47 0.07 0.18 0.39 3.95
(0,123) (0.24) (0.38) (0.51) (1.24) (1.69) (0.14) (0.14) (0.38) (4.40)
Professional 0.128 -0.27 -0.41 -0.55 -1.29 -1.67 0.08 0.19 0.43 4.45
(0.113) (0.22) (0.34) (0.46) (1.13) (1.56) (0.14) (0.12) (0.33) (4.04)
Office worker 0.221 -0.43 -0.67 -0.91 -2.21 -3.03 0.25 0.24 0.66 7.89
(0.131)* (0.24)* (0.37)* (0.50)* (1.26)* (1.97) (0.28) (0.06)*** (0.29)** (4.87)*
Foreman -0.027 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.27 0.32 n.s. -0.06 -0.10 -0.91
(0.274) (0.63) (0.95) (1.25) (2.82) (3.17) n.s. (0.59) (1.07) (9.14)
Skilled manual worker 0.132 -0.28 -0.42 -0.57 -1.34 -1.72 -0.08 0.20 0.44 4.62
(0.107) (0.21) (0.33) (0.44) (1.07) (1.49) (0.13) (0.11)* (0.32) (3.85)
Semi skilled manual worker -0.079 0.19 0.28 0.36 0.81 0.90 -0.02 -0.18 -0.31 -2.62
(0.133) (0.33) (0.49) (0.62) (1.37) (1.42) (0.09) (0.34) (0.56) (4.32)
Unskilled manual worker 0.164 -0.33 -0.52 -0.69 -1.66 -2.19 -0.14 0.22 0.53 5.79
(0.129) (0.24) (0.38) (0.52) (1.27) (1.86) (0.21) (0.10)** (0.34) (4.71)
Armed forces 0.024 -0.05 -0.08 -0.11 -0.25 -0.30 n.s. 0.04 0.09 0.83
(0.118) (0.03) (0.39) (0.52) (1.20) (1.47) n.s. (0.02) (0.42) (4.04)
Farmer (land owner) 0.214 -0.42 -0.66 -0.89 -2.15 -2.92 -0.23 0.25 0.65 7.63
(0.132)* (0.24)* (0.37)* (0.51)* (1.28)* (1.98) (0.27) (0.06)*** (0.31)** (4.90)*
Agricultural worker (non land owner) 0.262 -0.57 -0.87 -1.15 -2.67 -3.26 -0.09 0.46 0.93 8.99
(0.087)*** (0.21)*** (0.30)*** (0.39)*** (0.90)*** (1.13)*** (0.09) (0.14)*** (0.30)*** (3.04)***
Size of town -0.026 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.26 0.31 n.s. -0.05 -0.09 -0.86
(0.025) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.26) (0.30) n.s. (0.05) (0.09) (0.85)
Year 2006 -0.027 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.28 0.33 n.s. -0.05 -0.10 -0.93
(0.048) (0.11) (0.16) (0.21) (0.49) (0.58) n.s. (0.09) (0.18) (1.92)
Pr(y = n) 0.013 0.021 0.032 0.096 0.252 0.102 0.085 0.083 0.284
Observations 2,316
Pseudo R squared 0.009
1 Percentage values
n.s.= the value is not significant and lesser than 0.01. 
Marginal effects
1
16Table 2. Ordered Probit regression for considering the competition as a good feature for an economy (southern regions only)
Coefficient
y=1 y=2 y=3 y=4 y=5 y=6 y=7 y=8 y=9
Male 0.208 -0.50 -0.73 -1.00 -1.79 -2.65 0.20 0.70 0.83 6.54
(0.064)*** (0.19)*** (0.25)*** (0.34)*** (0.57)*** (0.82)*** (0.10)** (0.23)*** (0.27)*** (2.00)***
Income 0.047 -0.11 -0.16 -0.22 -0.40 -0.60 0.04 0.16 0.19 1.46
(0.20)*** (0.06)** (0.008)** (0.10)** (0.18)** (0.26)** (0.03)* (0.07)** (0.08)** (0.64)**
Age 0.005 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 n.s. 0.02 0.02 0.16
(0.003)* (7*10-3)* (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.02)* (0.03)* n.s. (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.08)*
Part time worker 0.215 -0.47 -0.70 -0.97 -1.82 -3.11 n.s. 0.56 0.76 0.71
(0.121)* (0.24)* (0.38)* (0.53)* (1.01)* (1.96) n.s. (0.23)** (0.38)** (0.42)*
Self-employed worker -0.265 0.71 1.01 1.33 2.28 2.79 -0.52 -1.08 -1.15 -7.78
(0.096)*** (0.32)** (0.44)** (0.55)** (0.86)*** (0.82)*** (0.30)* (0.47)** (0.47)** (2.61)***
Number of children -0.045 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.39 0.57 -0.04 -0.15 -0.18 -1.40
(0.020)** (0.05)** (0.007)** (0.10)** (0.18)** (0.27)** (0.03)* (0.07)** (0.08)** (0.64)**
Unemployed 0.064 -0.15 -0.22 -0.30 -0.56 -0.85 0.05 0.20 0.25 2.04
(0.141) (0.33) (0.48) (0.66) (1.22) (1.95) (0.07) (0.42) (0.53) (4.59)
Manager 0.256 -0.54 -0.81 -1.13 -2.216 -3.83 -0.06 0.61 0.87 8.65
(0.168) (0.32)* (0.49)* (0.69)* (1.37) (2.82) (0.27) (0.24)** (0.47)* (6.03)
Professional 0.150 -0.34 -0.50 -0.69 -1.28 -2.12 0.04 0.42 0.55 4.93
(0.160) (0.34) (0.50) (0.70) (1.35) (2.44) (0.09) (0.36) (0.53) (5.46)
Office worker 0.155 -0.34 -0.51 -0.71 -1.32 -2.20 0.03 0.43 0.56 5.09
(0.186) (0.39) (0.57) (0.81) (1.56) (2.90) (0.13) (0.39) (0.61) (6.41)
Foreman -0.052 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.45 0.64 -0.06 -0.19 -0.21 -1.61
(0.457) (1.17) (1.69) (2.26) (3.70) (5.31) (0.70) (1.74) (1.93) (13.86)
Skilled manual worker 0.230 -0.49 -0.74 -1.03 -1.94 -3.37 -0.02 0.58 0.80 7.68
(0.153) (0.31) (0.46) (0.65) (1.27) (2.50) (0.20) (0.26)** (0.46)* (5.41)
Semi skilled manual worker -0.138 0.36 0.51 0.69 1.20 1.56 -0.23 -0.54 -0.59 -4.15
(0.186) (0.53) (0.74) (0.96) (1.61) (1.83) (.44) (0.82) (0.84) (5.33)
Unskilled manual worker 0.084 -0.20 -0.29 -0.39 -0.72 -1.14 0.05 0.26 0.32 2.71
(0.164) (0.37) (0.54) (0.75) (1.40) (2.34) (0.04) (0.45) (0.59) (5.42)
Armed forces -0.189 0.51 0.72 0.95 1.64 2.03 -0.36 -0.77 -0.82 -5.59
(0.164) (0.49) (0.67) (0.87) (1.41) (1.42) (0.46) (0.77) (0.77) (4.50)
Farmer (land owner) 0.224 -0.48 -0.72 -1.00 -1.89 -3.29 -0.02 0.56 0.78 7.50
(0.172) (0.34) (0.51) (0.72) (1.42) (2.82) (0.22) (0.28)** (0.51) (6.07)
Agricultural worker (non land owner) 0.216 -0.51 -0.74 -1.01 -1.86 -2.90 0.13 0.67 0.83 6.94
(0.127)* (0.31)* (0.44)* (0.59)* (1.09)* (1.78)* (0.09) (0.36)* (0.47)* (4.17)*
Size of town -0.058 0.14 0.20 0.28 0.50 0.74 -0.06 -0.19 -0.23 -1.81
(0.033)* (0.09)* (0.12)* (0.16)* (0.29)* (0.43)* (0.04) (0.11)* (0.13)* (1.05)*
South-East -0.277 0.72 1.04 1.38 2.39 3.09 -0.47 -1.08 -1.18 -8.31
(0.080)*** (0.27)*** (0.36)*** (0.45)*** (0.71)*** (0.86)*** (0.20)** (0.35)*** (0.38)*** (2.31)***
Central Highland -0.117 0.30 0.43 0.58 1.01 1.38 -0.17 -0.44 -0.49 -3.57
(0.103) (0.28) (0.40) (0.52) (0.90) (1.12) (0.20) (0.42) (0.46) (3.06)
Central Coast -0.227 0.59 0.85 1.13 1.97 2.54 -0.38 -0.89 -0.97 -6.81
(0.091)*** (0.28)** (0.38)** (0.50)** (0.81)** (0.91)*** (0.23)* (0.41)** (0.43)** (2.59)***
Year 2006 0.123 -0.30 -0.44 -0.59 -1.06 -1.54 0.13 0.42 0.50 3.84
(0.066)* (0.18)* (0.25)* (0.33)* (0.59)* (0.80)* (0.10) (0.24)* (0.28)* (2.05)*
Pr(y = n) 0.014 0.023 0.036 0.082 0.291 0.110 0.096 0.069 0.246
Observations 1,213
Pseudo R squared 0.017
1 Percentage values
n.s.= the value is not significant and lesser than 0.01. 
Marginal effects
1
17Table 3. Ordered Probit regression for considering the competition as a good feature for an economy (northern regions only)
Coefficient
y=1 y=2 y=3 y=4 y=5 y=6 y=7 y=8 y=9
Male 0.135 -0.25 -0.41 -0.52 -1.64 -1.56 -0.16 0.10 0.45 4.83
(0.069)* (0.15)* (0.22)* (0.28)* (0.85)* (0.80)* (0.09)* (0.07) (0.24)* (2.46)**
Income 0.083 -0.16 -0.25 -0.32 -1.00 -0.96 -0.10 0.06 0.27 2.97
(0.025)*** (0.06)** (0.09)*** (0.11)*** (0.32)*** (0.30)*** (0.04)** (0.03)** (0.09)*** (0.89)***
Age 0.001 n.s. n.s. n.s. -0.01 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.03
(0.003) n.s. n.s. n.s. (0.04) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. (0.11)
Part time worker -0.195 0.41 0.64 0.80 2.40 2.00 0.08 -0.26 -0.78 -6.70
(0.107)* (0.26) (0.40)* (0.48)* (1.35)* (0.97)** (0.08) (0.21) (0.50) (3.52)*
Self-employed worker -0.037 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.45 0.42 0.04 -0.03 -0.13 -1.31
(0.084) (0.16) (0.26) (0.33) (1.03) (0.95) (0.09) (0.08) (0.29) (2.99)
Number of children -0.041 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.50 0.48 0.05 -0.03 -0.14 -1.48
(0.028) (0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.34) (0.32) (0.04) (0.02) (0.09) (0.99)
Unemployed 0.457 -0.64 -1.07 -1.43 -5.05 -6.22 -1.37 -0.39 0.55 17.50
(0.210)** (0.26)** (0.44)** (0.57)** (2.06)** (3.10)** (0.96) (0.51) (0.27)** (8.33)**
Manager 0.028 -0.05 -0.08 -0.11 -0.34 -0.33 -0.04 0.02 0.09 1.01
(0.193) (0.35) (0.57) (0.73) (2.34) (2.31) (0.28) (0.10) (0.60) (7.01)
Professional 0.050 -0.09 -0.15 -0.19 -0.61 -0.60 -0.07 0.03 0.16 1.81
(0.167) (0.30) (0.48) (0.62) (2.01) (2.04) (0.27) (0.07) (0.49) (6.10)
Office worker 0.211 -0.35 -0.57 -0.74 -2.48 -2.70 -0.44 -0.01 0.50 7.85
(0.202) (0.30) (0.50) (0.65) (2.28) (2.78) (0.60) (0.17) (0.29)* (7.77)
Foreman 0.112 -0.20 -0.32 -0.41 -1.34 -1.38 -0.19 0.03 0.31 4.11
(0.349) (0.56) (0.93) (1.22) (4.11) (4.54) (0.78) (0.06) (0.79) (13.10)
Skilled manual worker 0.064 -0.12 -0.19 -0.24 -0.77 -0.76 -0.09 0.03 0.20 2.31
(0.161) (0.28) (0.46) (0.59) (1.93) (1.98) (0.27) (0.05) (0.46) (5.90)
Semi skilled manual worker -0.051 0.10 0.16 0.20 0.62 0.57 0.05 -0.05 -0.18 -1.80
(0.203) (0.41) (0.64) (0.81) (2.50) (2.22) (0.16) (0.22) (0.76) (7.12)
Unskilled manual worker 0.369 -0.54 -0.90 -1.20 -4.17 -4.95 -1.00 -0.22 0.59 14.04
(0.238) (0.31)* (0.50)* (0.66)* (2.42)* (3.50) (0.99) (0.46) (0.16)*** (9.41)
Armed forces 0.154 -0.26 -0.43 -0.56 1.83 -1.91 -0.28 0.03 0.41 5.66
(0.169) (0.38) (0.45) (0.58) (1.98) (2.25) (0.41) (0.08) (0.35) (6.40)
Farmer (land owner) 0.139 -0.24 -0.39 -0.51 -1.66 -1.73 -0.25 0.03 0.38 5.13
(0.236) (0.37) (0.62) (0.81) (2.73) (3.11) (0.57) (0.08) (0.49) (8.90)
Agricultural worker (non land owner) 0.206 -0.38 -0.62 -0.79 -2.50 -2.41 -0.26 0.14 0.66 7.40
(0.136) (0.27) (0.43) (0.53) (1.65) (1.61) (0.20) (0.10) (0.43) (4.89)
Size of town 0.046 -0.09 -0.14 -0.18 -0.56 -0.53 -0.06 0.03 0.15 1.64
(0.043) (0.08) (0.13) (0.17) (0.53) (0.50) (0.06) (0.03) (0.15) (1.55)
North-Central -0.006 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 n.s. -0.01 -0.02 -0.21
(0.085) (0.16) (0.26) (0.33) (1.03) (0.98) n.s. (0.06) (0.28) (3.03)
North-East 0.227 -0.40 -0.64 -0.83 -2.71 -2.79 -0.39 0.07 0.63 8.32
(0.086)*** (0.18)** (0.27)** (0.33)** (1.04)*** (1.12)** (0.21)* (0.07) (0.22)*** (3.20)***
North-West 0.564 -0.76 -1.27 -1.71 -6.09 -7.72 -1.80 -0.60 0.51 21.66
(0.156)*** (0.24)*** (0.34)*** (0.45)*** (1.48)*** (2.37)*** (0.81)** (0.47) (0.34) (6.17)***
Year 2006 -0.166 0.30 0.49 0.62 2.00 1.97 0.24 -0.09 -0.51 -6.00
(0.074)** (0.15)** (0.23)** (0.29)** (0.91)** (0.93)** (0.14)* (0.05) (0.22)** (2.72)**
Pr(y = n) 0.010 0.018 0.026 0.109 0.213 0.097 0.077 0.102 0.322
Observations 1,103
Pseudo R squared 0.014
1 Percentage values
n.s.= the value is not significant and lesser than 0.01. 
Marginal effects
1
18Table 4. Ordered Probit regression for considering income inequality as an incentive to workers
Coefficient
y=1 y=2 y=3 y=4 y=5 y=6 y=7 y=8 y=9
Male 0.118 -0.43 -0.45 -0.39 -0.66 -0.10 0.14 0.64 0.66 3.27
(0.045)*** (0.17)*** (0.17)*** (0.15)*** (0.25)*** (0.05)** (0.06)** (0.24)*** (0.25)*** (1.24)***
Income 0.034 -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 -0.19 -0.03 0.04 0.18 0.19 0.94
(0.015)** (0.06)** (0.06)** (0.05)** (0.09)** (0.02)* (0.02)** (0.08)** (0.09)** (0.42)**
South -0.289 1.05 1.09 0.95 1.62 0.28 -0.32 -1.53 -1.60 -8.03
(0.053)*** (0.22)*** (0.23)*** (0.20)*** (0.32)*** (0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.31)*** (0.32)*** (1.48)***
Age -0.005 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 4*10-3 -6*10-3 -0.03 -0.03 -0.13
(0.002)*** (7*10-3)*** (7*10-3)*** (6*10-3)*** (0.01)** (2*10-3)*** (2*10-3)*** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.05)***
Part time worker 0.141 -0.51 -0.54 -0.49 -0.88 -0.20 0.09 0.67 0.75 4.09
(0.084)* (0.31)* (0.33)* (0.30)* (0.58) (0.17) (0.03)*** (0.35)** (0.43)* (2.56)*
Self-employed worker -0.170 0.62 0.63 0.53 0.83 0.06 -0.28 -1.01 -0.98 -4.47
(0.057)*** (0.22)*** (0.21)*** (0.18)*** (0.25)*** (0.04) (0.13)** (0.37)*** (0.34)*** (1.42)***
Number of children 0.008 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 n.s. n.s. 0.04 0.05 0.22
(0.015) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) n.s. n.s. (0.08) (0.09) (0.43)
Unemployed -0.043 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.03 -0.06 -0.24 -0.24 -1.16
(0.108) (0.39) (0.40) (0.35) (0.56) (0.06) (0.16) (0.62) (0.62) (2.90)
Manager 0.148 -0.54 -0.57 -0.51 -0.93 -0.22 0.09 0.69 0.79 4.32
(0.114) (0.42) (0.45) (0.41) (0.79) (0.24) (0.03)*** (0.45) (0.58) (3.51)
Professional 0.101 -0.37 -0.39 -0.35 -0.61 -0.13 0.08 0.50 0.55 2.90
(0.117) (0.43) (0.46) (0.41) (0.77) (0.20) (0.05) (0.52) (0.61) (3.49)
Office worker 0.186 -0.68 -0.72 -0.65 -1.21 -0.31 0.08 0.82 0.97 5.52
(0.142) (0.51) (0.56) (0.52) (1.04) (0.35) (0.07) (0.49)* (0.68) (4.50)
Foreman 0.047 -0.17 -0.18 -0.16 -0.27 -0.05 0.05 0.24 0.26 1.32
(0.254) (0.93) (0.98) (0.87) (1.55) (0.34) (0.20) (1.24) (1.37) (7.30)
Skilled manual worker -0.036 0.13 0.14 -0.16 0.20 0.03 -0.05 -0.20 -0.21 -0.99
(0.105) (0.38) (0.39) (0.34) (0.55) (0.07) (0.15) (0.60) (0.60) (2.82)
Semi skilled manual worker 0.032 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.18 -0.03 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.90
(0.127) (0.47) (0.49) (0.43) (0.75) (0.15) (0.12) (0.65) (0.70) (3.60)
Unskilled manual worker -0.213 0.77 0.77 0.64 0.94 n.s. -0.43 -1.35 -1.25 -5.41
(0.128)* (0.45)* (0.44)* (0.34)* (0.40)** n.s. (0.36) (0.92) (0.78)* (2.94)*
Armed forces -0.049 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.03 -0.07 -0.28 -0.28 -1.33
(0.127) (0.47) (0.48) (0.41) (0.65) (0.06) (0.20) (0.75) (0.73) (3.40)
Farmer (land owner) -0.031 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.17 0.02 -0.04 -0.17 -0.18 -0.85
(0.128) (0.47) (0.48) (0.41) (0.67) (0.08) (0.18) (0.73) (0.73) (3.45)
Agricultural worker (non land owner) -0.219 0.80 0.82 0.71 1.17 0.16 -0.29 -1.22 -1.23 5.96
(0.090)** (0.33)** (0.34)** (0.29)** (0.46)*** (0.07)** (0.15)** (0.53)** (0.52)** (2.40)**
Size of town 0.029 -0.11 -0.11 -0.09 -0.16 -0.03 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.81
(0.026) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.02) (0.03) (0.14) (0.14) (0.71)
Year 2006 -0.127 0.47 0.49 0.43 0.73 0.13 -0.14 -0.67 -0.71 -3.57
(0.046)*** (0.17)*** (0.18)*** (0.16)*** (0.28)*** (0.06)** (0.05)*** (0.24)*** (0.25)*** (1.31)***
Pr(y = n) 0.037 0.046 0.049 0.139 0.094 0.089 0.129 0.077 0.196
Observations 2,351
Pseudo R squared 0.011
1 Percentage values
n.s.= the value is not significant and lesser than 0.01. 
Marginal effects
1
19Table 5. Ordered Probit regression for considering income inequality as an incentive to workers (southern regions only)
Coefficient
y=1 y=2 y=3 y=4 y=5 y=6 y=7 y=8 y=9
Male 0.071 -0.28 -0.28 -0.20 -0.29 n.s. 0.17 0.39 0.44 1.83
(0.062) (0.25) (0.25) (0.18) (0.26) n.s. (0.15) (0.34) (0.39) (1.60)
Income 0.013 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 n.s. 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.35
(0.020) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) n.s. (0.05) (0.11) (0.13) (0.52)
Age -0.007 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 n.s. -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.17
(0.003)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)** n.s. (7*10-4)** (0.01)** (0.02)** (0.07)**
Part time worker 0.360 -1.41 -1.51 -1.16 -2.05 -0.41 0.37 1.49 2.00 10.41
(0.122)*** (0.50)*** (0.56)*** (0.45)*** (0.90)** (0.32) (0.14)*** (0.37)*** (0.62)*** (3.92)***
Self-employed worker -0.189 0.72 0.71 0.48 0.06 -0.14 -0.56 -1.11 -1.19 -4.52
(0.088)** (0.34)** (0.33)** (0.22)** (0.02)*** (0.12) (0.31)* (0.56)** (0.58)** (1.98)**
Number of children 0.006 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 n.s. 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.15
(0.019) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) n.s. (0.05) (0.10) (0.12) (0.50)
Unemployed -0.009 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 n.s. -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.22
(0.131) (0.51) (0.52) (0.37) (0.52) n.s. (0.32) (0.72) (0.81) (3.33)
Manager 0.175 -0.69 -0.72 -0.54 -0.87 -0.09 0.30 0.84 1.04 4.79
(0.150) (0.60) (0.64) (0.50) (0.88) (0.20) (0.16)* (0.62) (0.85) (4.39)
Professional 0.238 -0.94 -0.99 -0.75 -1.25 -0.19 0.34 1.08 1.38 6.65
(0.161) (0.65) (0.70) (0.56) (1.04) (0.28) (0.11)*** (0.59)* (0.87) (4.91)
Office worker 0.278 -1.10 -1.17 -0.89 -1.54 -0.28 0.33 1.20 1.58 7.94
(0.173)* (0.69) (0.75) (0.61) (1.20) (0.38) (0.10)*** (0.55)** (0.88)* (5.94)
Foreman 0.304 -1.20 -1.28 -0.99 -1.76 -0.36 0.30 1.25 1.69 8.84
(0.404) (1.56) (1.75) (1.44) (2.94) (1.00) (0.23) (1.06) (1.92) (13.11)
Skilled manual worker 0.015 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 n.s. 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.38
(0.139) (0.54) (0.55) (0.40) (0.58) n.s. (0.32) (0.74) (0.85) (3.59)
Semi skilled manual worker 0.029 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.12 n.s. 0.07 0.15 0.18 0.74
(0.154) (0.61) (0.62) (0.45) (0.67) n.s. (0.33) (0.80) (0.94) (4.03)
Unskilled manual worker -0.179 0.68 0.66 0.45 0.53 -0.15 -0.55 -1.06 -1.13 -4.23
(0.150) (0.55) (0.52) (0.33) (0.30)* (0.23) (0.57) (0.97) (0.97) (3.27)
Armed forces 0.193 -0.76 -0.80 -0.60 -0.99 -0.13 0.30 0.90 1.13 5.35
(0.169) (0.67) (0.73) (0.57) (1.04) (0.25) (0.14)** (0.66) (0.93) (5.03)
Farmer (land owner) 0.213 -0.84 -0.89 -0.67 -1.10 -0.15 0.33 0.99 1.25 5.93
(0.164) (0.66) (0.71) (0.55) (1.03) (0.27) (0.12)*** (0.62) (0.89) (4.94)
Agricultural worker (non land owner) -0.071 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.28 -0.02 -0.18 -0.39 -0.44 -1.80
(0.121) (0.47) (0.47) (0.33) (0.46) (0.04) (0.32) (0.68) (0.76) (3.03)
Size of town 0.094 -0.37 -0.37 -0.27 -0.38 0.01 0.23 0.51 0.58 2.40
(0.038)** (0.15)** (0.16)** (0.11)** (0.16)** (0.03) (0.10)** (0.21)** (0.24)** (0.95)**
South-East 0.013 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 n.s. 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.34
(0.075) (0.29) (0.30) (0.21) (0.31) n.s. (0.18) (0.40) (0.46) (1.92)
Central Highland 0.503 -1.95 -2.12 -1.66 -3.07 -0.77 0.28 1.82 2.64 15.08
(0.099)*** (0.44)*** (0.49)*** (0.40)*** (0.79)*** (0.33)** (0.20) (0.31)*** (0.49)*** (3.33)***
Central Coast -0.066 0.26 0.26 0.18 0.25 -0.02 -0.17 -0.37 -0.41 -1.66
(0.092) (0.35) (0.35) (0.25) (0.32) (0.05) (0.25) (0.52) (0.58) (2.26)
Year 2006 -0.200 0.78 0.80 0.57 0.84 n.s. -0.45 -1.05 -1.22 -1.22
(0.063)*** (0.27)*** (0.27)*** (0.20)*** (0.29)*** n.s. (0.15)*** (0.34)*** (0.39)*** (0.39)***
Pr(y = n) 0.044 0.056 0.052 0.143 0.090 0.096 0.104 0.077 0.077
Observations 1,224
Pseudo R squared 0.019
1 Percentage values
n.s.= the value is not significant and lesser than 0.01. 
Marginal effects
1
20Table 6. Ordered Probit regression for considering income inequality as an incentive to workers (northern regions only)
Coefficient
y=1 y=2 y=3 y=4 y=5 y=6 y=7 y=8 y=9
Male 0.212 -0.75 -0.78 -0.86 -1.59 -0.45 0.05 1.13 1.10 6.15
(0.067)*** (0.27)*** (0.27)*** (0.30)*** (0.51)*** (0.16)*** (0.07) (0.39)*** (0.37)*** (1.93)***
Income 0.044 -0.16 -0.16 -0.18 -0.34 -0.10 n.s. 0.23 0.23 1.28
(0.24)* (0.09)* (0.09)* (0.10)* (0.19)* (0.06)* n.s. (0.13)* (0.13)* (0.70)*
Age -0.002 n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.01 n.s. n.s. -0.01 -0.01 -0.06
(0.003) n.s. n.s. n.s. (0.02) n.s. n.s. (0.01) (0.01) (0.08)
Part time worker -0.105 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.75 0.18 0.06 -0.62 -0.56 -2.95
(0.118) (0.43) (0.43) (0.47) (0.79) (0.16) (0.11) (0.77) (0.65) (3.19)
Self-employed worker -0.108 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.78 0.20 0.05 -0.62 -0.58 -3.06
(0.080) (0.30) (0.30) (0.33) (0.56) (0.13) (0.07) (0.50) (0.44) (2.22)
Number of children 0.001 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.03
(0.027) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. (0.08)
Unemployed -0.087 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.62 0.16 -0.04 -0.50 -0.46 -2.44
(0.211) (0.76) (0.77) (0.83) (1.43) (0.30) (0.18) (1.33) (1.16) (5.75)
Manager 0.066 -0.23 -0.24 -0.27 -0.52 -0.16 n.s. 0.32 0.33 1.95
(0.190) (0.66) (0.70) (0.79) (1.54) (0.52) n.s. (0.85) (0.94) (5.79)
Professional -0.076 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.55 0.14 -0.04 -0.44 -0.41 -2.15
(0.180) (0.64) (0.66) (0.71) (1.24) (0.27) (0.13) (1.11) (0.98) (4.95)
Office worker 0.003 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 n.s. 0.02 0.02 0.09
(0.240) (0.85) (0.89) (0.98) (1.83) (0.53) n.s. (1.26) (1.24) (0.70)
Foreman -0.346 1.24 1.22 1.27 1.93 0.16 -0.54 -2.53 -1.96 -8.66
(0.373) (1.33) (1.22) (1.16) (1.23) (0.50) (1.08) (3.33) (2.20) (7.81)
Skilled manual worker -0.140 0.50 0.51 0.56 0.98 0.23 -0.09 -0.85 -0.76 -3.89
(0.172) (0.62) (0.63) (0.67) (1.10) (0.19) (0.20) (1.16) (0.96) (4.54)
Semi skilled manual worker -0.068 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.50 0.13 -0.03 -0.39 -0.36 -1.93
(0.221) (0.79) (0.81) (0.88) (1.54) (0.35) (0.16) (1.35) (1.20) (6.11)
Unskilled manual worker -0.337 1.21 1.20 1.24 1.94 0.20 -0.50 -2.42 -1.90 -8.54
(0.250) (0.90) (0.84) (0.80) (0.93)** (0.29) (0.68) (2.20) (1.48) (5.38)
Armed forces -0.358 1.28 1.27 1.33 2.08 0.22 -0.51 -2.55 2.01 -9.12
(0.195)* (0.72)* (0.67)* (0.65)** (0.76)*** (0.24) (0.53) (1.70) (1.15)* (4.21)**
Farmer (land owner) -0.383 1.37 1.35 1.39 2.11 0.16 -0.61 -2.80 -2.16 -9.53
(0.220)* (0.79)* (0.73) (0.69)** (0.74)*** (0.33) (0.65) (1.99) (1.31)* (4.56)**
Agricultural worker (non land owner) -0.403 1.41 1.46 1.61 2.96 0.81 -0.11 -2.16 -2.08 -11.58
(0.150)*** (0.57)** (0.58)*** (0.63)*** (1.10)*** (0.32)*** (0.14) (0.85)*** (0.79)*** (4.26)***
Size of town -0.059 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.45 0.13 -0.01 -0.31 -0.31 -1.72
(0.040) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.31) (0.09) (0.02) (0.21) (0.21) (1.17)
North-Central -0.014 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.03 n.s. 0.08 -0.07 -0.41
(0.085) (0.30) (0.31) (0.34) (0.64) (0.18) n.s. (0.46) (0.44) (2.44)
North-East -0.123 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.90 0.23 -0.05 -0.70 -0.65 -3.50
(0.082) (0.30) (0.31) (0.33) (0.57) (0.13)* (0.07) (0.50) (0.45) (2.28)
North-West -0.791 2.60 2.41 2.28 2.52 -0.87 -2.05 -6.56 -4.41 -16.84
(0.146)*** (0.57)*** (0.47)*** (0.38)*** (0.56)*** (0.69) (0.72)*** (1.55)*** (0.88)*** (2.06)***
Year 2006 -0.060 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.46 0.14 n.s. -0.31 -0.31 -1.77
(0.073) (0.26) (0.27) (0.30) (0.57) (0.18) n.s. (0.37) (0.37) (2.17)
Pr(y = n) 0.031 0.037 0.048 0.140 0.102 0.085 0.158 0.078 0.213
Observations 1,127
Pseudo R squared 0.020
1 Percentage values
n.s.= the value is not significant and lesser than 0.01. 
Marginal effects
1
21Table 7. Ordered Probit regression for desiring an increase of the state ownership of firms
Coefficient
y=1 y=2 y=3 y=4 y=5 y=6 y=7 y=8 y=9
Male -0.031 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.02 -0.14 -0.10 -0.16 -0.12 -0.60
(0.045) (0.23) (0.20) (0.16) (0.03) (0.21) (0.16) (0.23) (0.27) (0.90)
Income -0.013 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.26
(0.016) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.31)
South -0.026 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.02 -0.12 0.08 -0.13 -0.15 -0.52
(0.054) (0.27) (0.24) (0.19) (0.04) (0.25) (0.17) (0.28) (0.31) (1.06)
Age -0.014 0.07 0.06 0.05 n.s. -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.28





















Part time worker 0.078 -0.40 -0.36 -0.30 -0.10 0.34 0.25 0.40 0.46 1.62
(0.084) (0.43) (0.39) (0.34) (0.17) (0.34) (0.26) (0.42) (0.50) (1.80)
Self-employed worker 0.242 -1.24 -1.14 -0.99 -0.56 0.92 0.72 1.19 1.41 5.28
(0.059)*** (0.32)*** (0.30)*** (0.28)*** (0.25)** (0.20)*** (0.18)*** (0.30)*** (0.37)*** (1.39)***
Number of children 0.044 -0.22 -0.20 -1.58 -0.03 0.21 0.14 0.23 0.26 0.88
(0.016)*** (0.08)*** (0.07)*** (0.06)*** (0.02) (0.08)*** (0.05)*** (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.33)***
Unemployed -0.238 1.14 0.94 0.67 -0.31 -1.33 -0.83 -1.25 -1.36 -4.20
(0.113)** (0.52)** (0.39)** (0.24)*** (0.38) (0.72)* (0.42)** (0.61)** (0.62)** (1.76)**
Manager -0.257 1.22 0.99 0.69 -0.41 -1.47 -0.91 -1.36 -1.46 -4.45
(0.124)** (0.55)** (0.41)** (0.23)*** (0.49) (0.82)* (0.47)* (0.67)** (0.69)** (1.84)**
Professional -0.200 0.97 0.80 0.58 -0.22 -1.10 -0.70 -1.05 -1.15 -3.58
(0.121)* (0.56)* (0.43)* (0.27)** (0.36) (0.76) (0.45) (0.65)* (0.68)* (1.94)*
Office worker 0.020 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.02 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.40
(0.147) (0.74) (0.66) (0.54) (0.15) (0.66) (0.47) (0.75) (0.86) (2.97)
Foreman 0.190 -0.97 -0.90 -0.80 -0.49 0.07 0.56 0.93 1.11 4.21
(0.368) (1.90) (1.84) (1.74) (1.63) (0.96) (0.94) (1.69) (2.13) (8.98)
Skilled manual worker -0.171 0.83 0.70 0.52 -0.13 -0.92 -0.59 -0.90 -0.98 -3.11
(0.114) (0.54) (0.43)* (0.29)* (0.27) (0.69) (0.42) (0.61) (0.65) (1.90)*
Semi skilled manual worker -0.177 0.86 0.71 (0.52) -0.18 -0.97 -0.61 -0.93 -1.02 -3.18
(0.126) (0.59) (0.46) (0.29)* (0.34) (0.78) (0.46) (0.67) (0.71) (2.05)
Unskilled manual worker -0.011 0.06 0.05 0.04 n.s. -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.22
(0.143) (0.72) (0.62) (0.05) n.s. (0.69) (0.47) (0.74) (0.83) (2.80)
Armed forces 0.071 -0.36 -0.32 -0.27 -0.09 0.31 0.23 0.36 0.42 1.47
(0.132) (0.68) (0.62) (0.53) (0.26) (0.53) (0.40) (0.66) (0.77) (2.82)
Farmer (land owner) -0.159 0.78 0.65 0.48 -0.13 -0.86 -0.55 -0.84 -0.92 -2.89
(0.132) (0.62) (0.49) (0.33) (0.31) (0.79) (0.47) (0.70) (0.75) (2.20)
Agricultural worker (non land owner) -0.251 1.25 1.08 0.85 0.05 -1.23 -0.83 -1.30 -1.46 -4.86
(0.098)*** (0.49)*** (0.41)*** (0.32)*** (0.13) (0.51)*** (0.34)** (0.51)*** (0.57)** (1.84)***
Size of town 0.018 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.35
(0.026) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.02) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.15) (0.51)
Year 2006 -0.152 0.77 0.68 0.56 0.15 -0.69 -0.49 -0.78 -0.89 -3.07
(0.046)*** (0.24)*** (0.22)*** (0.18)*** (0.10) (0.21)*** (0.15)*** (0.24)*** (0.28)*** (0.97)***
Pr(y = n) 0.059 0.069 0.086 0.209 0.120 0.051 0.063 0.056 0.119
Observations 2,259
Pseudo R squared 0.008
1 Percentage values
n.s.= the value is not significant and lesser than 0.01. 
Marginal effects
1
22Table 8. Ordered Probit regression for desiring an increase of the state ownership of firms (southern regions only)
Coefficient
y=1 y=2 y=3 y=4 y=5 y=6 y=7 y=8 y=9
Male -0.043 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.05 -0.21 -0.17 -0.22 -0.23 -0.82
(0.064) (0.30) (0.25) (0.23) (0.08) (0.31) (0.26) (0.32) (0.34) (1.22)
Income -0.003 0.01 0.01 0.01 n.s. -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06
(0.020) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) n.s. (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.39)
Age -0.014 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.27
(0.011) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.21)
Age squared n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Part time worker 0.002 -0.01 -0.01 n.s. n.s. 0.01 n.s. 0.01 0.01 0.04
(0.120) (0.57) (0.47) n.s. n.s. (0.58) n.s. (0.61) (0.64) (2.32)
Self-employed worker 0.301 -1.45 -1.26 -1.24 -1.10 1.13 1.09 1.45 1.60 6.56
(0.092)*** (0.47)*** (0.43)*** (0.44)*** (0.59)* (0.29)*** (0.33)*** (0.45)*** (0.52)*** (2.22)***
Number of children 0.051 -0.24 -0.20 -0.18 -0.06 0.25 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.97
(0.022)** (0.11)** (0.09)** (0.08)** (0.05) (0.11)** (0.09)** (0.11)** (0.12)** (0.42)**
Unemployed -0.274 1.24 0.97 0.80 -0.33 -1.56 -1.18 -1.40 -1.41 -4.65
(0.153)* (0.66)* (0.49)** (0.36)** (0.56) (0.99) (0.69)* (0.80)* (0.78)* (2.30)**
Manager -0.540 2.15 1.51 1.00 -2.27 -3.50 -2.38 -2.69 -2.58 -7.68
(0.183)*** (0.60)*** (0.33)*** (0.19)*** (1.70) (1.40)** (0.85)*** (0.90)*** (0.81)*** (1.87)***
Professional -0.195 0.89 0.70 0.59 -0.16 -1.09 -0.83 -1.00 -1.01 -3.37
(0.179) (0.78) (0.59) (0.44) (0.52) (1.12) (0.80) (0.93) (0.90) (2.78)
Office worker 0.097 -0.46 -0.39 -0.37 -0.21 0.43 0.38 0.48 0.52 1.96
(0.203) (0.98) (0.85) (0.82) (0.66) (0.81) (0.76) (1.00) (1.09) (4.32)
Foreman 0.676 -3.07 -2.91 -3.20 -5.42 0.71 1.56 2.56 3.26 18.29
(0.564) (2.18) (2.31) (2.89) (7.52) (1.72) (0.25)*** (1.05)** (2.01)* (19.42)
Skilled manual worker -0.258 1.16 0.90 0.73 -0.37 -1.49 -1.11 -1.32 -1.33 -4.33
(0.168) (0.71)* (0.51)* (0.36)** (0.69) (1.11) (0.76) (0.87) (0.83) (2.44)*
Semi skilled manual worker -0.239 1.07 0.83 0.68 -0.34 -1.38 -1.03 -1.23 -1.23 -4.00
(0.183) (0.77) (0.56) (0.39)* (0.75) (1.21) (0.85) (0.95) (0.91) (2.65)
Unskilled manual worker -0.137 0.64 0.51 0.44 -0.04 -0.74 -0.58 -0.70 -0.72 -2.45
(0.186) (0.84) (0.65) (0.52) (0.33) (1.10) (0.85) (0.96) (0.96) (3.07)
Armed forces -0.032 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.03 -1.62 -0.13 -0.16 -0.17 -0.61
(0.204) (0.96) (0.78) (0.69) (0.10) (1.05) (0.85) (1.05) (1.08) (3.79)
Farmer (land owner) 0.038 -0.18 -0.15 -0.14 -0.06 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.75
(0.183) (0.87) (0.74) (0.69) (0.36) (0.83) (0.72) (0.92) (0.98) (3.65)
Agricultural worker (non land owner) -0.370 1.70 1.37 1.19 -0.02 -1.95 -1.54 -1.88 -1.93 -6.69
(0.148)** (0.68)** (0.53)*** (0.44)*** (0.35) (0.85)** (0.64)** (0.78)** (0.79)** (2.54)***
Size of town 0.040 -0.19 -0.16 -0.14 -0.05 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.77
(0.036) (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) (0.05) (0.17) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19) (0.67)
South-East -0.109 0.51 0.42 0.37 0.06 -0.56 -0.45 -0.56 -0.58 -2.03
(0.078) (0.37) (0.30) (0.26) (0.09) (0.42) (0.33) (0.40) (0.42) (1.42)
Central Highland -0.139 0.65 0.52 0.45 -0.01 -0.75 -0.59 -0.71 -0.73 -2.50
(0.096) (0.44) (0.35) (0.29) (0.16) (0.56) (0.42) (0.50) (0.50) (1.62)
Central Coast 0.513 -2.43 -2.17 -2.19 -2.41 1.59 1.70 2.36 2.68 11.81
(0.095)*** (0.52)*** (0.49)*** (0.52)*** (0.85)*** (0.28)*** (0.32)*** (0.48)*** (0.58)*** (2.56)***
Year 2006 -0.203 0.96 0.80 0.74 0.31 -0.95 -0.81 -1.02 -1.08 -3.97
(0.065)*** (0.33)*** (0.27)*** (0.25)*** (0.20) (0.32)*** (0.27)*** (0.35)*** (0.36)*** (1.30)***
Pr(y = n) 0.055 0.059 0.077 0.245 0.116 0.060 0.058 0.049 0.113
Observations 1,184
Pseudo R squared 0.021
1 Percentage values
n.s.= the value is not significant and lesser than 0.01. 
Marginal effects
1
23Table 9. Ordered Probit regression for desiring an increase of the state ownership of firms (northern regions only)
Coefficient
y=1 y=2 y=3 y=4 y=5 y=6 y=7 y=8 y=9
Male -0.043 0.24 0.22 0.16 0.02 -0.21 -0.12 -0.24 -0.28 -0.83
(0.068) (0.38) (0.36) (0.26) (0.04) (0.34) (0.19) (0.38) (0.45) (1.32)
Income -0.012 0.07 0.06 0.04 n.s. -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.22
(0.026) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) n.s. (0.13) (0.07) (0.14) (0.17) (0.50)
Age -0.016 0.09 0.08 0.06 n.s. -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 -0.31
(0.012) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) n.s. (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.23)
Age squared 2*10-3 -1*10-3 -1*10-3 -9*10-4 n.s. 1*10-3 6*10-4 1*10-3 1*10-3 4*10-3
(1*10-3)* (<1*10-3)* (<1*10-3)* (<1*10-3)* n.s. (<1*10-3)* (<1*10-4)* (<1*10-3)* (<1*10-3)* (1*10-3)*
Part time worker 0.183 -1.03 -1.00 -0.80 -0.32 0.74 0.46 0.97 1.21 3.85
(0.114) (0.66) (0.66) (0.57) (0.37) (0.38)** (0.27)* (0.60)* (0.78) (2.59)
Self-employed worker 0.186 -1.05 -1.01 -0.79 -0.27 0.79 0.48 1.00 1.23 3.84
(0.082)** (0.47)** (0.47)** (0.39)** (0.23) (0.32)** (0.21)** (0.44)** (0.56)** (1.78)
Number of children 0.023 -0.13 -0.12 -0.09 n.s. 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.44
(0.026) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) n.s. (0.13) (0.07) (0.14) (0.17) (0.49)
Unemployed -0.204 1.10 0.95 0.60 -0.25 -1.20 -0.60 -1.16 -1.31 -3.48
(0.189) (0.98) (0.78) (0.40) (0.56) (1.28) (0.60) (1.09) (1.19) (2.86)
Manager -0.084 0.46 0.42 0.29 -0.02 -0.45 -0.24 -0.47 -0.55 -1.54
(0.168) (0.92) (0.81) (0.53) (0.16) (0.97) (0.50) (0.96) (1.09) (2.94)
Professional -0.341 1.76 1.46 0.81 -0.75 -2.16 -1.03 -1.94 -2.14 -5.42
(0.166)** (0.79)** (0.56)*** (0.21)*** (0.81) (1.26)* (0.55)* (0.97)** (0.99)** (2.15)**
Office worker 0.017 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 n.s. 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.33
(0.215) (1.20) (1.13) (0.84) n.s. (1.03) (0.58) (1.18) (1.42) (4.20)
Foreman -0.174 0.94 0.83 0.52 0.20 -1.02 -0.52 -0.99 -1.13 -3.01
(0.448) (2.31) (1.88) (0.98) (1.19) (2.98) (1.40) (2.58) (2.82) (0.69)
Skilled manual worker -0.088 0.49 0.44 0.30 -0.02 -0.47 -0.25 -0.49 -0.58 -1.61
(0.156) (0.85) (0.75) (0.49) (0.15) (0.90) (0.46) (0.89) (1.01) (2.73)
Semi skilled manual worker -0.101 0.55 0.50 0.34 -0.04 -0.55 -0.29 -0.57 -0.66 -1.82
(0.174) (0.94) (0.82) (0.52) (0.23) (1.03) (0.52) (1.00) (1.13) (0.30)
Unskilled manual worker 0.269 -1.51 -1.52 -1.27 -0.69 0.92 0.63 1.37 1.76 5.96
(0.247) (1.38) (1.47) (1.37) (1.17) (0.46)** (0.46) (1.13) (1.59) (6.25)
Armed forces 0.137 -0.77 -0.74 -0.58 -0.19 0.59 0.35 0.74 0.90 2.81
(0.174) (0.98) (0.99) (0.82) (0.44) (0.62) (0.42) (0.90) (1.15) (3.83)
Farmer (land owner) -0.325 1.68 1.40 0.77 -0.72 -2.07 -0.99 -1.86 -2.05 -5.17
(0.199)* (0.93)* (0.66)** (0.22)*** (0.97) (1.51) (0.66) (1.15)* (1.18)* (2.59)**
Agricultural worker (non land owner) -0.194 1.08 1.00 0.72 0.05 -0.97 -0.54 1.08 -1.27 -3.69
(0.129) (0.73) (0.66) (0.47) (0.12) (0.67) (0.37) (0.73) (0.85) (2.43)
Size of town 0.037 -0.21 -0.19 -0.14 -0.01 0.18 0.10 0.20 0.24 0.71
(0.040) (0.22) (0.21) (0.15) (0.03) (0.20) (0.11) (0.22) (0.27) (0.77)
North-Central -0.119 0.66 0.60 0.42 -0.02 -0.63 -0.34 -0.67 -0.78 -2.20
(0.077) (0.43) (0.39) (0.26)* (0.09) (0.43) (0.23) (0.45) (0.51) (1.38)
North-East -0.255 1.39 1.24 0.82 -0.18 -1.43 -0.74 -1.44 -1.66 -4.54
(0.090)*** (0.52)*** (0.42)*** (0.25)*** (0.25) (0.60)** (0.30)** (0.54)*** (0.59)*** (1.47)***
North-West -0.222 1.19 1.04 0.65 -0.28 -1.31 -0.66 -1.26 -1.43 -3.79
(0.154) (0.80) (0.64)* (0.32)** (0.48) (1.06) (0.49) (0.90) (0.96) (2.30)*
Year 2006 -0.033 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.02 -0.16 -0.09 -0.18 -0.22 -0.63
(0.071) (0.40) (0.37) (0.27) (0.04) (0.34) (0.19) (0.39) (0.46) (1.37)
Pr(y = n) 0.063 0.081 0.099 0.180 0.131 0.044 0.068 0.062 0.113
Observations 1,075
Pseudo R squared 0.012
1 Percentage values
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